The potential disastrous effects of a chemical plant accident are well known. How much should we be worried about potential security and safety risks for our chemical plants? An April 6th article from the Seattle PI highlights these issues.
A recent and tragic accident at a refinery in Anacortes, Washington makes these concerns all too real. An explosion killed 5 people and critically injured two more and many speculate it was due to poor safety regulations.
Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, Washington (from Flickr.com)
Adding worry to the issue is the fact that these plants are what Barack Obama called in 2006, “stationary weapons of mass destruction”. The Seattle PI Article claims there are approximately 6,000 plants in need of special security provisions, yet only 12 are currently under inspection. Furthermore, many federal programs are full of delay that keeps us from being much further along than we should be.
The security concerns for these plants an important issue, but what about the environmental impacts of an incident? Be it from a threat or accident, incidents at these chemical plants are usually quite severe. The recent accident in Anacortes shows that even a small explosion can have disastrous consequences. Events that result in zero loss of life, such as the Exxon Valdez spill, had terrible effects not only on the local wildlife, but the fishing and tourism industries.
How big are these security and safety concerns for chemical plants? It may be difficult to tell now, but the environmental and economic impacts of potential chemical accident are not. Do you think we need to make significant steps towards improving both the safety and security of chemical plants? Is this a lost cause? Are there too many plants for this to be a realistic goal? Share you thoughts below
(Read my other posts and more blogs like it at Planet Forward)
What is interesting on this issue is the relative lack of press coverage. Once in a while NPR does a short segment on chemical plant safety and security, but even cyber security gets more media attention.
I would advocate a risk-informed approach. Where you can reasonably implement measures that address the most risk significant safety and security concerns should be the focus of efforts. Of course, the public has often thought of chemical plants the way they have on coal: i.e., they are supposed to be dangerous and bad for the environment. We need new paradigms where we acknowledge we need a chemical industry and it can be managed more safely and securely.
I agree that all aspects chemical safety and security should be considered and addressed effectively. However, the Seattle Post’s reprint of the Houston Chronicle story you mentioned unfortunately did not fully describe the scope of the safety and security efforts already underway at chemical facilities around the country.
Each year, American Chemistry Council members invest more than $2 billion enhancing safety at their facilities and have achieved a worker safety record that is more than four times safer than the average of the U.S. manufacturing sector.
Chemical facilities operate under the oversight of a host of regulatory programs and federal agencies that regulate safety and security, such as the EPA, OSHA, DOT, TSA and DHS to name just a few.
Additionally, the Chemical Safety Board is charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents and makes recommendations to EPA and OSHA based on those investigations.
The Chronicle article specifically mentions the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), which has made significant progress since being implemented by DHS. Already, the number of high risk facilities has been reduced from 7,000 sites to 6,000. It also worth noting that DHS has put inspectors in place and created regional offices to begin ramping up the inspection process which is just one phase of CFATS.
Further improving chemical facility security is definitely not being overlooked, and it is not only a realistic goal, but one we are working with the federal government to achieve. As Rep. Gene Green says in the article, we should allow current programs like CFATS to be allowed to move forward instead of disrupting the progress on the ground by changing or creating new regulations.
Scott Jensen
The American Chemistry Council